How banks assist capital flight from Africa: A literature review by Heggstad, Kari & Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
R 2010: 6
How Banks Assist Capital 
Flight from Africa: 
A Literature Review
Kari Heggstad
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
is an independent, non-profi t 
research institution and a 
major international centre in
policy-oriented and applied
development research. Focus
is on development and human
rights issues and on international 
conditions that affect such
issues. The geographical focus is
Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern and 
Central Asia, the Middle East and
Latin America.
CMI combines applied and 
theoretical research. CMI
research intends to assist policy 
formulation, improve the basis 
for decision-making and promote
public debate on international 
development issues.
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Banks Assist Capital Flight  
from Africa 
A Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
Kari Heggstad 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2010: 6 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project number 
29036 
 
 
Project title 
Norad: Capital Flight and the Banking Sector 
 iii 
 
Contents 
 
PREFACE ....................................................................................................................................................... V 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. VI 
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1 
2 DEFINING CAPITAL FLIGHT AND BANKING ................................................................................................... 2 
3 WHAT IS ON THE AGENDA? ......................................................................................................................... 4 
(I)  MONEY LAUNDERING ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
(II)  SECRECY JURISDICTIONS AND CALLS FOR TRANSPARENCY ......................................................................................... 5 
(III)  CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND BANKING IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES ............................................................................ 7 
(IV)  ASSET RECOVERY ............................................................................................................................................. 9 
4 CAPITAL FLIGHT – WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THE BANKS ......................................................................... 11 
5 RELEVANT ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................................... 14 
6 POLICY RELEVANCE OF THE REVIEWED LITERATURE .................................................................................. 18 
7 ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................................................................... 20 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................ 21 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
CMI REPORT HOW BANKS ASSIST CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA R 2010: 6 
v 
 
Preface 
Systematic studies of the banking sector’s involvement in facilitating capital flight from developing 
countries are limited. This report was commissioned by Norad’s Anti-Corruption Project (ANKOR) 
for the purpose of summarising key lessons from the existing literature and to identifying 
knowledge gaps. The study focuses on capital flight from Africa and how much needed public 
finances are hidden abroad. It is a desk study, based on a review of library and online literature 
databases and reports and documentation from national and international organisations. 
 
The material reviewed does not provide the information necessary to draw firm conclusions as to 
what constitutes ‘best practice’ in providing donor support for better regulation of banks and 
financial institutions in Africa. The term ‘best practice’ itself is unclear and depends much on the 
environment within which finance institutions work. The review shows that banks should not be 
disregarded as passive players when analysing capital flight. Banks play an active role in facilitating 
capital flight from Africa. However, to improve the regulation of the banking and finance sectors, 
there is a need for more detailed knowledge on how banks actually operate as facilitators and the 
mechanisms applied.  
 
The paper is prepared by Kari Heggstad and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad from Chr. Michelsen Institute 
(CMI), Bergen, Norway. Fridtjov Thorkildsen, Director of ANKOR, gave useful suggestions for the 
structure of the study and Lise Stensrud followed up during the writing process. Valuable comments 
on earlier drafts were received from Fredrik Eriksson and Alessandra Fontana. The librarians at 
Chr. Michelsen Institute have provided important support, and we are grateful for their always 
positive and effective handling of our frequent and often demanding requests for relevant literature. 
The responsibility for any errors or shortcomings rests entirely on the authors.  
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Executive summary  
This paper provides an overview of existing literature on the role of banks in capital flight from 
Africa. The review demonstrates that banks should not be disregarded as passive players when 
analysing capital flight. Banks play an active role in facilitating capital flight. However, to improve 
the regulation of the banking and finance sectors, there is a need for more detailed knowledge on 
how banks actually operate as facilitators and the mechanisms applied.  
 
The study addresses the following questions: 
 
 What literature exists on the role of banks in capital flight from Africa?  
 What are the main focus areas of the available literature? 
 What are the most common methods for banks to channel illicit financial flows? 
 Which institutions and actors are currently addressing the issues?  
 Which knowledge gaps can be identified through the literature review?    
 
Our general conclusion is that more knowledge is needed on how banks assist political elites and 
their close associates, companies, individuals and organised crime to channel capital out of African 
countries. 
 
Relevant literature where the banking sector features can be divided into four thematic areas: 
(i) Money laundering  
The status of regulations for anti-money laundering varies to a large extent between African 
countries. The literature shows that there is a huge challenge for banks to avoid tainted funds from 
politically exposed persons (PEPs). Investigations have found that financial institutions have been 
aggressively marketing methods of hiding money from national tax authorities in secrecy 
jurisdictions. Channelling funds to terrorist activities has taken place via formal finance institutions. 
However, informal financial networks are commonly also involved. 
(ii) Secrecy jurisdictions and calls for transparency  
Banks in secrecy jurisdictions play an important role in facilitating the hiding and laundering of 
capital from Africa because of the secrecy space that exists for financial activities and banking 
(Kapoor, 2007; Murphy, 2008). The legal part of banking activities in secrecy jurisdictions is 
argued to be largely overlooked in much of the literature criticising these types of financial 
structures. 
(III) Customer due diligence and banking in developing countries 
For anti money laundering and prevention of terrorist financing strict ‘know your customer’ (KYC) 
routines are essential. The rules and practices for due diligence vary substantially between 
jurisdictions and between banks. Assessments by the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) show that although commitment to follow customer due diligence 
principles are increasing world wide, many countries are largely non-compliant. There are huge 
variations between African countries with respect to the level of regulations and their 
implementation (ESAAMLG 2009a). 
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The incentives of banks to do due diligence checks on their customers are debated in the literature. 
The main difference is between those who argue that the benefits are too large for private banks to 
resist the temptation to facilitate banking for PEPs and wealthy individuals regardless of the origin 
of the funds, and those who consider the risk to be too high for banks if due diligence rules are not 
followed. 
(IV) Asset recovery 
Effective strategies and laws to trace illicit financial flows are still inadequate in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the major obstacles to the recovery of stolen assets are said to be the lack of capacity in 
developing countries to negotiate the complex legal issues together with the lack of will from some 
developed countries to assist in the repatriation process (Chaikin and Sharman, 2009; Goredema 
2009). 
Capital flight - with a little help from the banks 
“The management of the payment system places banks in a crucial position with respect to the 
money laundering activity” (Masciandro, 2007:29). Typically banks in secrecy jurisdictions are 
used in the process. The level of sophistication varies, and the most complex schemes include 
multiple jurisdictions and a large number of bank accounts in an array of banks. In many high-level 
cases the money is moved through a maze of shell companies and respectable nominees. Collusion 
with bank employees at all levels is often found.  
 
Still, banks are often involved in only parts of the money laundering chain and the placement of 
illicitly gained cash. Thus, improved regulation of the banking sector will only contribute to solve a 
part of the problem. 
Relevant organisations 
An increasing number of organisations are addressing the challenges of illicit financial flows. These 
include global NGOs, think tanks, research institutes and financial intelligence units. Recently, 
several development agencies, including multilateral finance institutions and bilateral donors, have 
placed capital flight and asset recovery on their agenda. An overview of key organisations and 
initiatives are presented in Chapter 5. 
Policy relevance 
The specific country setting should be considered when development agencies address capital flight 
challenges. The high levels of corruption that often is linked to capital flight from Africa are likely 
to put severe constraints on the implementation of reforms.  
a) Recommendations for banking institutions:  
 Create clear control mechanisms, policies and procedures  
 Conduct regular training of staff in due diligence and ‘know your customer’ (KYC) 
principles 
 Establish comprehensive KYC routines 
 Streamline reporting routines from bank staff to relevant authorities  
 Place the main responsibility at the management level  
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b) Recommendations for governments and development agencies:  
 The cross-ministerial issue of illicit financial flows will need a cross-ministerial approach 
for donor engagement and government efforts 
 When required, development agencies should provide resources for professional guidance 
and capacity building in asset recovery cases.   
 UNCAC and FATF may be easier to follow in practice if governments agree on an effective 
review mechanism.  
 FATF member governments could use their position within FATF to make fighting 
corruption a priority and to ensure that FATF members comply with the standards. 
 Banks, governments and development agencies can allocate resources to capacity building 
and training of bank personnel in due diligence and in accordance with KYC principles.  
 Identification of bank customers will be more secure with nationally approved and 
standardised identification papers. Donor agencies could potentially assist government 
effort to develop the system if requested.   
 Governments should establish legislation that makes aggressive marketing of banking in tax 
havens within the boundaries of their country more difficult.  
c) Recommendations for international organisations:  
 FATF should assess whether their recommendations are sufficiently addressing the 
particular context of African economies. 
 NGOs and the media may play an important role in informing civil society of corrupt 
actions of PEPs by publishing knowledge that is easily available and accessible for the 
public.  
Further research  
Much of the current debate focuses on financial centres in secrecy jurisdictions. It is, however, also 
important to gain better knowledge and understanding of the whole chain of official and unofficial 
finance institutions, and the linkages between these.  
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1 Introduction  
Banks and financial institutions are an important piece of the puzzle when illicit financial flows 
leave developing countries. Thus, the supply side of services facilitating illicit financial flows has 
recently received more attention by donors and policymakers (e.g. NOU 2009). Still, systematic 
studies of the banking sector’s involvement in facilitating capital flight from developing countries 
are limited. This note provides an overview of existing literature. It focuses on capital flight from 
Africa and how dearly needed public finances are hidden abroad. The review shows that banks 
should not be disregarded as passive players when analysing capital flight. Banks play an active role 
in facilitating capital flight from Africa. However, to improve the regulation of the banking and 
finance sectors, there is a need for more detailed knowledge on how banks actually operate as 
facilitators and the mechanisms applied.  
 
The study addresses the following questions: 
 
 What literature exists on the role of banks in capital flight from Africa?  
 What are the main focus areas of the available literature? 
 What are the most common methods for banks to channel illicit financial flows? 
 Which institutions and actors are currently addressing the issues?  
 Which knowledge gaps can be identified through the literature review?    
 
The study includes research of library and online literature databases and material compiled from 
national and international organisations. 
More knowledge is needed  
Our general conclusion is that more knowledge is needed on how banks assist politicians and their 
close associates, individuals, businesses and organised crime organisations to channel capital out of 
Africa. The existing literature on capital flight addresses parts of the challenges with respect to 
illicit financial flows from African countries, including developmental impacts and the role of 
offshore financial centres. The role of onshore banks, however, is generally not examined. Further, 
literature on the banking sector in Africa rarely refers to capital flight. Thus, a challenge for this 
review has been to identify literature where capital flight and banks are analysed together in an 
African context. The review maps and assesses the most relevant available documentation, and 
gives an introduction to the questions raised above. Further, it identifies some knowledge gaps for 
further research. This review may therefore serve as an initial first step for the development of more 
in-depth knowledge on how banks facilitate capital flight from Africa.   
 
The report is structured as follows: The following chapter 2 clarifies how capital flight and banking 
are defined in this review. Chapter 3 presents the main discussions addressed in the current 
literature. An overview of the most common methods applied for channelling illicit financial flows 
through banks is included in chapter 4. It explains how banks operate when transferring with 
suspicious funds on behalf of their clients. Chapter 5 provides an overview of organisations and 
institutions currently working on issues related to banking regulations and capital flight. The map of 
involved actors may serve as a guide to practitioners and researchers who want to explore the issues 
further. Chapter 6 presents policy recommendations based on the reviewed literature. Finally, 
chapter 7 concludes by suggesting issues for further research.   
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2 Defining capital flight and banking 
The term capital flight does not have one universally accepted and precise definition. Actors who 
aim to reduce or stop capital flight from developing countries thus have a challenge. What exactly 
are they addressing? In this review we will follow the definition by Kapoor (2007:6-7) of capital 
flight as “unrecorded and (mostly) untaxed illicit leakage of capital and resources out of 
country”. His understanding opens up for an analysis of how capital flight potentially impacts on 
development. The characteristics of capital flight according to the above definition are that the 
resources are domestic wealth that is permanently put out of reach for domestic authorities. Much of 
the value is unrecorded and attempts to hide the origin, destination and true ownership of the capital 
are parts of the concept.  
 
Many authors use the term ‘capital flight’ to describe processes beyond what is described above. 
Examples of other angles are to view capital flight as (a) sudden short-term capital outflows, 
including both licit and illicit flows, or (b) the stock of wealth, both licitly and illicitly acquired, 
held abroad by the citizens of a developing country (Epstein, 2005:58-65). In this report we will not 
take into account the licit financial flows from developing countries. We will, however, apply a 
sufficiently wide definition to include most channels of illicit flows from poor countries (Kapoor, 
2007:6-9). The concepts ‘illicit financial flows’ and ‘capital flight’ will be used interchangeably, 
although according to some definitions capital flight also contains the licit stream of money leaving 
the country.  
 
The distinction between what should be defined as illicit and what can pass for licit flows are not 
always clear. On the one hand a lawyer will categorise what is not illegal as legal. A lawyer can 
thus perceive the grey zones as their area of creating a business, because they are in a special 
position to advice clients on how to use the loopholes and grey zones for the best interest of the 
client. On the other hand, grey zones can be perceived as potentially dodgy, because there is space 
for immoral behaviour that does not necessarily care for the original intention of the laws.  
Example of capital flight: public loans are turned into private assets   
Foreign debt and capital flight are found to be closely interlinked. Research by economists and 
political scientists suggests that a large extent of the capital flight from Africa has been public loans 
that were channelled out of the country as private funds. The ‘know your customer’ principle of 
banks has not managed to stop politically exposed persons (PEPs) from stealing public funds and to 
storing the stolen assets in private accounts abroad. A ‘revolving door’ relationship has been 
identified between debt and capital flight. In some cases as much as 80 percent of the public loans 
have left the country as private assets through capital flight (Ajayi and Khan, 2000; Boyce and 
Ndikumana, 2001; Cerra et al., 2008; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998; 
Ndikumana and Boyce, 2008). 
 
Banks are in this report referred to as financial institutions that are licensed by the government. The 
financial services offered may vary from country to country, but managing bank accounts are seen 
as one of the most indispensable services of a bank. There are several methods of transferring 
values that do not involve a bank transfer. However, non-banks that provide payment services such 
as remittance companies offer a narrow set of services and are therefore rarely considered to be a 
proficient substitute for banks. Banks and other financial service providers are rather seen to 
complement each other. Thus, flows of money channelled through various institutions are expected 
to end up in the banking system at some point. Therefore, it is important to focus specifically on the 
role of banks in facilitating capital flight. Masciandro (2007:27), however, claims that the 
development of the architecture of markets and the characteristics of intermediaries have blurred the 
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difference between banking and non-banking firms. Hence, we will include some observations on 
financial services provided by other institutions in order to show how banks fit into a wider global 
financial structure.  
 
The jurisdiction which the bank operates within lays out conditions for what kind of services a bank 
can offer.1 Varying levels of customer confidentiality are the most important difference between 
banks which are pointed out in the literature. Offshore banks, secrecy jurisdictions and tax 
havens are the most commonly used concepts to describe the extraordinary confidentiality 
conditions that are found within certain jurisdictions, such as Mauritius and Cayman Island. A 
commonly accepted definition is not in place to describe and categorise jurisdictions with different 
financial services combined with secrecy rules and tax benefits. Therefore, no conclusive list exists 
of countries with a banking sector that are specifically attractive for transfers of illicit capital.  
 
‘Secrecy jurisdiction’ is the term most frequently used in this report since it points to the legal 
space which the banks operate within. This term has a better explanatory value to the phenomenon 
of regulatory vacuums created by secrecy jurisdictions than alternative expressions.2 A secrecy 
jurisdiction has two main characteristics: a) part of its financial regulations is primarily designed to 
benefit non-residents of its territorial domain; and b) regulations exist that prevent the identification 
of those who use its regulations and are residents outside the jurisdiction (Murphy 2008). The 
secrecy space that is formed by these jurisdictions can be referred to as the unregulated spaces or 
regulatory vacuums for economic transactions that are created by the services offered. Banks, 
lawyers, accountants, trust companies, and others who assist customers to access the services 
offered by secrecy jurisdictions are examples of secrecy providers. Secrecy world can be used to 
describe the combination of the secrecy jurisdiction, - space and – providers (ibid.: 28). For the case 
of simplicity, secrecy jurisdiction refers in this paper to both the geographical location and the 
conceptual secrecy space.   
 
                                                     
1 A jurisdiction refers to the geographical area within which authority and powers have been granted to the executive and 
legislative branches. This may be a state, dependency, protectorate, sub-national state, principality or other that has the 
ability to create law. 
2 Alternative concepts to describe secrecy jurisdictions are offshore banking and tax havens. These two descriptions are by 
some accused of being imprecise. The term ‘offshore’ may give an incorrect impression about a specific geographical 
location offshore. The Financial Secrecy Index shows that many of the least transparent places are onshore in the UK and 
the US (TJN and Christian Aid 2009). Further, the secrecy space that is created due to lack of transparency can be 
regarded as a non-geographical space. Thus, ‘offshore’ can be a misleading concept. The term ‘tax haven’ may give an 
impression that tax avoidance is the only purpose, while research show that other financial services are equally important. 
Murphy (2008) and NOU (2009) provide good overviews of the discussion on definitions and concepts.  
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3 What is on the agenda?  
Relevant literature where the banking sector features can be divided into four thematic areas: 
 
(i) Money laundering  
(ii) Secrecy jurisdictions and calls for transparency  
(iii) Customer due diligence and banking in developing countries 
(iv) Asset recovery 
 
Each of these categories is discussed below, drawing on existing literature within the field.  
(i) Money laundering 
Money laundering requires three major steps. First is the placement where the money is entering the 
legitimate financial system. Second is the layering where the money is moved through the 
international financial system. Third, the money is integrated into the legitimate economy when its 
origin is disguised (UNODC, 1998; Chêne, 2009). Banks could potentially be involved in all three 
steps in various ways, but not necessarily in such a way that bank personnel would be able to trace 
the origin of the money or the actual owner.  
 
Charles Goredema from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Cape Town, has published two 
monographs which provide overviews of the capacity to tackling money laundering in East and 
Southern Africa (Goredema 2004a, 2004b). Recent updates on the region are found in some IMF 
country reports, including ‘Mauritius: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes— 
FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism’ (IMF, 2008), and reports from the Eastern and Southern Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG, 2009a, 2009b; FATF and ESAAMLG, 2009; Goredema and Madzima, 2009). The 
status of regulations for anti-money laundering in various African countries varies to a large extent, 
and policy making must thus focus on the country level to be efficient. Moshi (2007) underlines that 
there are some structures that are unique and common for African countries. He argues that these 
have to be accounted for in anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT) measures. Moshi (2007) criticises the global initiative of FATF3 and other financial 
standards for not giving practical and realistic methods of how to prevent and detect money 
laundering and terrorist financing in the African context. According to Moshi (2007:7), the 
standards do not sufficiently recognise that African economies are (a) largely cash based, (b) there 
is a heavy reliance on a parallel, informal banking system, and (c) informal value transfer methods 
are the norm. Others, such as Christensen (2009:7), argue against those claiming that money 
laundering is a structural problem and blame instead lack of political will.  
Tax evasion, terrorist financing and corruption 
The literature on money laundering is often divided thematically into tax evasion, terrorist financing 
and corruption. Examples are OECD’s initiative on tax crimes and money laundering (OECD, 
2009); UN conventions and other international standards concerning anti-money laundering and 
countering the financing of terrorism (UNODC, 2007); and the book ‘Corruption and money 
laundering. A symbiotic relationship’ by Chaikin and Sharman (2009). Thus, there are overlaps 
                                                     
3 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and 
promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing that has made two 
sets of AML/CFT recommendations that are internationally acknowledged.  
CMI REPORT HOW BANKS ASSIST CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA R 2010: 6 
 
5 
 
between the thematic areas because the expected money laundering techniques commonly coincide. 
Banks often play a facilitating role in money laundering, although we will expect that the behaviour 
of banks differ depending on the type of customer and the suspected origin of the funds. 
Investigations show that there is a large challenge for banks to avoid tainted funds from politically 
exposed persons (PEPs). Banks have been utilized to channel illicit funds acquired by politically 
powerful persons out of the country of residence and into hidden, private accounts (Palmer, 2009). 
Examples from Africa include former president Sani Abacha in Nigeria, President Teodoro Obiang 
in Equatorial Guinea and the late president Omar Bongo in Gabon (Daniel et al., 2008/09; US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1999; Jimu, 2009; Pieth, 2008; Global Witness, 
2009a).   
 
With respect to tax evasion, the U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that 
financial institutions were aggressively marketing methods of hiding money from the national tax 
authorities into secrecy jurisdictions. For instance, bankers from the Swizz banking giant UBS 
travelled to the U.S. in search of wealthy individuals and proactively promoted their services to 
these. UBS has now stopped all staff travels to the U.S. (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2003, 2006, 2008). How widespread the ‘UBS-practice’ is and how targeted African 
countries have been is not known from the literature reviewed. But it is likely that the practise 
revealed in the U.S. has been common in other countries too, though - in the African context - 
probably more targeted towards a small political and economic elite. 
 
Channelling funds to terrorist activities often take place via formal finance institutions. However, 
informal financial networks are commonly also involved. These are systems where formal rules and 
regulations are not guaranteed to be followed (Passas, 2003, 2006). Underground (hawala) banking 
are used for legal transfers between countries and other purposes than terrorist funding, but it is 
mainly in the literature on terrorist funding that the issue is raised. Due diligence practices and 
registers of transfers do not necessarily exist in informal banking (Baker, 2005; McCusker, 2005). 
Further research on the underground banking system is required to shed light on whether and how 
informal systems parallel or substitute the formal bank system.  
(ii) Secrecy jurisdictions and calls for transparency   
Banks in secrecy jurisdictions have been found to play an important role in facilitating the hiding or 
laundering of capital from Africa because of the secrecy space that exists for financial activities and 
banking (Kapoor, 2007; Murphy, 2008). It is argued that more transparency in the financial sector 
in these jurisdictions is required to give businesses, criminals and politically exposed persons 
(PEPs), such as high-level politicians and associates, fewer ways to hide their illegally gained 
capital. For developing countries more transparency  and fewer hiding places could mean that less 
public funds would be channelled out of the country as private assets. Thus, it is argued that more 
resources would be available for service provision and poverty reduction measures (Christian Aid, 
2008, Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, 2009a, 2009b).  
Support for secrecy jurisdictions? 
Although there is a wide literature promoting transparency and condemning the negative 
consequences of secrecy banking, the literature is not exclusively portraying secrecy jurisdictions 
negatively. There is general agreement of the need to countering money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, but the views on how to do so differ. On the one side are those promoting 
transparency who argue in favour of country-by-country reporting and global agreements to end 
banking secrecy (Christensen, 2009; Christian Aid, 2008; NoU, 2009; Murphy, 2009). On the other 
side are trade organisations, business people and lawyers who argue that the picture portrayed of 
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secrecy jurisdictions is highly skewed, and that these jurisdictions are professional, well functioning 
finance centres with important functions for legitimate businesses. Examples of positive features are 
political and economic stability, standardisation of language, a tailored legal framework and that 
double taxation of international operations are easier to avoid. The legal part of banking activities in 
secrecy jurisdictions is argued to be largely overlooked in much of the literature criticising these 
types of financial structures. To close down banking operations in secrecy jurisdictions are therefore 
not a desired alternative for all (Antoine, 2002; NHO, 2009). In the volume ‘Capitalism’s Achilles 
heel. Dirty money and how to renew the free-market system’ Raymond Baker (2005) criticises 
the ideas supporting the secrecy structures as fundamentally flawed. He dismisses the possibility of 
being able to “successfully protect ourselves from a narrow range of dirty money we think 
hurts us, while at the same time cultivating a much broader range of dirty money that we 
think help us” (Baker, 2005:190). However, full transparency is not necessarily what is requested. 
OECD (2010:14) states that some banking secrecy must be accepted, but that it is the possibility of 
lifting the secrecy in well defined circumstances to enable countries to enforce their own laws that 
are required.    
The end of secrecy?  
As a consequence of the crisis that struck the global financial system in 2007/08, secrecy 
jurisdictions have come into public scrutiny for providing tools for tax evasion, money laundering 
and terrorist funding. In the report ‘The morning after the night before. The impact of the 
financial crisis on the developing world’ Christian Aid (2008) explains how lack of transparency 
in financial centres and banking secrecy contributed to create turmoil in the global financial market. 
Earlier publications also point to the damaging effects of banking secrecy, but the financial crisis 
has given a new urgency to the topic (G20, 2009; Global Witness et al., 2009). OECD (2010:2) 
describes the topic of tax evasion and secrecy jurisdictions as ‘very high on the political agenda’.  
 
The media have followed up the focus on secrecy jurisdictions. Newspaper articles such as the New 
York Times ‘A Swiss bank is set to open its secret files’ (Browning, 2009) report a change in the 
secrecy rules of some jurisdictions. Christian Aid (2008:12) goes as far as to claim that most of the 
shadow banking sector has disappeared after the financial crisis since banks are not willing to 
engage in activities to the levels of business and mortgage as before the crisis. Other authors, 
however, seem to advocate the opposite view. For instance, Christensen (2009) raises concern about 
Ghana’s plans of creating a new secrecy jurisdiction in Accra. Reuters (2009) reports that the 
“Swiss bank UBS (UBSN.VX) is threatening to move its headquarters out of Switzerland if the 
authorities impose too many new regulations in the wake of the global financial crisis”. In sum, 
although there have been some reported improvements in bank transparency the general picture is 
dubious.  
Further research 
More insight on how the financial crisis has impacted on banking behaviour towards secrecy and 
due diligence controls is required to provide relevant policy recommendations. There is also a need 
for more research on the consequences for various actors of changing the secrecy laws. How will 
the economy of the secrecy jurisdictions be affected? What will be the consequences for 
investments that cannot be channelled through secrecy jurisdictions anymore? An example of 
research that considers developmental consequences of secrecy jurisdictions are the Norwegian 
report ‘Tax havens and development’ (NOU, 2009;), which discusses whether the state owned 
investment fund for developing countries (Norfund) should channel its investments via secrecy 
jurisdictions. A relevant following up study would be to estimate economic consequences for 
selected developing countries if Norfund’s use of secrecy jurisdictions was banned. In this 
CMI REPORT HOW BANKS ASSIST CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA R 2010: 6 
 
7 
 
perspective, it is worth mentioning that Sweden decided in 2009 to stop using secrecy jurisdictions 
to channel development aid (Development Today, 2009). 
(iii) Customer due diligence and banking in African countries  
The due diligence done by banks on their customers is called Know Your Customer (KYC), and the 
essential elements are listed in the box to the left. Due diligence done by banks are important to 
establish knowledge of who the true beneficiaries of the funds are and whether the funds are 
obtained through legal or illegal activities. For anti money laundering and prevention of terrorist 
financing strict KYC routines are essential.  
 
The rules and practices for due diligence vary substantially between jurisdictions and between 
banks. FATF and the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision have created international 
recommendations for minimum standards. Individual jurisdictions and banks decide their own due 
diligence rules. The purpose of the guidelines is to inform banks and jurisdictions of the importance 
of due diligence and how due diligence can be implemented. The international recommendations 
can also be used as a benchmark to evaluate at what level jurisdictions and banks are committed to 
due diligence procedures (UNODC, 2007; BIS, 2001).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
African realities versus recommended regulations  
According to its own statements, the banking sector is committed to self-regulation and to the 
adaptation of customer due diligence standards from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervison 
(BCBS) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)(BIS, 2001). However, 
the actual compliance to the principles has proved to be weak in many cases. Assessments by the 
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) show that although 
commitment to follow customer due diligence principles are increasing world wide, many countries 
are largely non-compliant. There are huge variations between African countries with respect to the 
level of regulations and their implementation (ESAAMLG 2009a). For instance, in Uganda banks 
train their staff in ‘Know your customer’ principles. Yet, in practice the principle is almost 
impossible to follow since there are no officially recognised identification documents for Ugandan 
nationals. The lack of acknowledged identification documents opens up for fraud (ESAAMLG 
2009b). In South Africa, on the other hand, the system is more developed. In 2007/08 the South 
African Financial Intelligence Centre received 24,585 suspicious transfer reports (STRs). Another 
issue, however, is what happens when a STR is filed and concern has been raised, and whether the 
South African judicial system has the capacity to process all the required cases (FIC South Africa, 
2007-2008).  
 
Further research on the relationship between Financial Intelligence Units, revenue authorities, 
customs departments and related institutions such as the judiciary is required to generate better 
Due diligence by banks –essential elements: 
1. Customer acceptance policy 
2. Customer identification 
3. On-going monitoring of high risk accounts 
4. Risk management 
The bank has to both check the identity of the true customer and 
routinely monitor the accounts (BIS, 2001: 5). 
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knowledge on where the weak and vulnerable links at the country level are for detecting and 
hindering fraud and money laundering. Since the systems differ between countries, country specific 
studies are important.  
Why should banks know their customers?  
The incentives of banks to do due diligence checks on their customers are debated in the literature. 
The main difference is between those who argue that the benefits are too large for private banks to 
resist the temptation to facilitate banking for PEPs and wealthy individuals regardless of the origin 
of the funds, and those who consider the risk to be too high for banks if due diligence rules are not 
followed. The main reasoning behind these diverging views is presented below.  
 
Banks have incentives to assist wealthy customers with managing their wealth regardless of the 
origin of the funds, because the nature of the banking business makes large customers attractive 
(Palmer, 2009). Global Witness has documented that high ranking politicians have been helped by 
banks to transfer large amounts of public funds into secret or hidden private accounts (Global 
Witness, 1999; 2009a; 2009b). However, FATF, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors argue that banks put themselves in a high risk situation 
if KYC routines are not followed. Serious banks should therefore not engage in business 
transactions when the legitimate origin of the funds is unclear. The risks for banks if not following 
KYC regulations are reputational, operational, legal and on customer concentration (BIS, 2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reputational risk is serious for banks since their business requires that depositors, creditors and 
the general marketplace trust the bank to be professionally run. As Christian Aid (2008:8) points out 
“It’s a world where reputation is all”. If there is doubt about the qualifications, integrity and 
motivations of the bank, there is a risk that clients will leave. The same counts for the operational 
risk if there is doubt that internal processes are practiced efficiently. Legal risks open for costly 
lawsuits and unenforceable contracts that can affect the operations of the bank. If the bank does not 
do a proper due diligence check the concentration risk is unmanaged, and the bank risks to become 
too dependent of a few clients because the bank management does not have an overview of who and 
how many independent clients they have (BIS, 2001:3-5).  
 
Although there is considerable risk connected to weak due diligence, several reports and newspaper 
articles document that banks nevertheless do assist politically exposed persons and powerful, 
wealthy figures. Global Witness placed the role of banks on the international agenda in 2009 with 
the report ‘Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt regimes’ (Global Witness 
2009a). The report received much attention (Palmer, 2009; The Economist, 2009a). In November 
Ways of complicating due diligence controls in banks:   
 
 Trust, nominee and fiduciary accounts 
 Corporate vehicles 
 Introduced business 
 Client accounts opened by professional intermediaries 
 Politically exposed persons 
 Non-face-to-face customers 
 Correspondent banking  
 
Source: (BIS 2001:13) 
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2009, Global Witness published a new study on how banks facilitate illicit flows from developing 
countries. The report, entitled ‘The secret life of a shopaholic’, documents, for instance, how the 
son of the president of Equatorial Guinea managed to use a network of Western banks to channel 
large amounts of public funds out of the country and into private accounts (Global Witness, 2009a; 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2007; Urbina, 2009). The Global Witness reports are naming politically 
exposed persons (PEPs), and they have a clear agenda to stop Western governments and banks from 
facilitating the looting of public funds from developing countries. The focus of these and similar 
studies is on Western banks and their lack of compliance to the ‘Know Your Customer’ principle 
(US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1999; Greenberg et al., 2009; The 
Economist, 2009a, 2009b). The findings are interesting because they show that capital flight and 
money laundering may be facilitated by Western banks even though these banks often are perceived 
as more legitimate compared to offshore banks and poorly regulated banks in developing countries.   
 
In the book ‘Black finance. The economics of money laundering’ Masciandro (2007) 
distinguishes between categories of banks. Banks can not be separated into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ones. 
Effective and honest banks may not be aware that funds might be illicit because the money 
launderer uses skilful methods to avoid scrutiny by bank staff. In honest, but ineffective banks the 
gaps between good intentions and actual compliance with the regulations can be taken advantage of. 
There are also dishonest banks that will facilitate illicit activities. Baker (2005:43) explains a 
method for creating one’s own bank to laundering money and taking advantage of innocent 
depositors. Further, in the volume  ’All  is clouded by desire’ Block and Weaver (2004) show how 
the  Geneva  banker  Bruce  Rappaport  and  the  Bank  of  New  York  worked  together  with  dodgy 
Russian banks to move and launder USD 6 billion for Russian organized criminals and other shady 
organizations and individuals. In other words, the intention behind the bank activity will play a role 
for policy makers promoting the implementation of stricter KYC regulations. Honest banks, 
whether efficient or not, will presumably willingly comply while dishonest banks have to be 
addressed in a different way.  
 
In sum, the literature offers a combination of regulations and handbooks on due diligence, critical 
investigative reports from NGOs and investigative units that are finding banks to be complicit in 
illicit money flows and capital flight. The main focus is on politically exposed persons and their 
looting of their countries. While large amounts disappear from Africa each year due to PEPs, there 
are other actors as well that would be important to examine closer. Who are the main actors 
involved in illicit flows? Who are channelling most capital out of the various African countries?  
(iv) Asset recovery  
The literature on asset recovery is a combination of technical guidebooks and policy debates 
considering challenges connected to confiscated funds and who and how to repatriate the funds.  
 
“The major obstacles to the recovery of stolen assets are said to be the lack of 
capacity in developing countries to negotiate the complex legal issues, and the 
uninterest shown by some developed countries in assisting the repatriation process” 
(Chaikin and Sharman, 2009:42). 
 
The recovery of illicitly transferred capital requires the collaboration of banks in different countries 
for information sharing with the authorities, and, importantly, for not facilitating the rapid 
movement of detected funds to new hidden accounts and secret destinations. Repeatedly, 
investigators experience that banks only give a minimum of the information required and often stall 
the process as long as possible, to allow their clients’ time to relocate their assets (Basel Institute on 
Governance, 2009; Daniel et al., 2008/09; Dulin and Mercaert, 2009; Fofack and Ndikumana, 2009; 
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Greenberg et al., 2009; Jimu, 2009; Pieth, 2008). In ‘Recovery of proceeds of crime: observations 
on practical challenges in sub-Saharan Africa’ Goredema (2009:34-35) concludes that effective 
strategies and laws to trace illicit financial flows are still inadequate in the region. Within sub-
Saharan Africa there are large regulatory loopholes, such as in Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Malawi and Zimbabwe. The countries that have strengthened their legislation to create 
greater leeway to law enforcement, such as South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Tanzania, do 
not seem to have managed to turn theory into practice and improve significantly. The Abacha case 
provides an enlightening example of how Western banks gave special privileges to powerful 
customers (PANA, 2005; Daniel et al., 2008/09; BBC, 2001; BBC, 2000; BBC, 2002; Gert, 1999).  
 
This chapter has given an overview of the literature on how banks assist capital flight from Africa. 
Accordingly, money laundering, secrecy jurisdictions, due diligence and asset recovery have been 
discussed. The next chapter focuses on how illicit flows are channelled out of the country of origin.  
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4 Capital flight – with a little help from the banks 
“The management of the payment system places banks in a crucial position with 
respect to the money laundering activity” (Masciandro, 2007:29). 
 
The literature on money laundering contains detailed descriptions on how financial capital is moved 
out of Africa illicitly with the banks as a tool. The US Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
(1999, 2003, 2006, 2008) provides good overviews over characteristics of the banking system that 
may facilitate illicit activities. Some of these features are summarised in the table below. The 
information is gathered from extensive criminal investigations on illicit money flows from a wide 
range of banks and countries, including Nigeria and Gabon.  
 
 
Examples of banking features used for illicit transfers of funds 
Feature  How it may facilitate illicit activity 
Multiple accounts 
Banker opens multiple accounts in multiple 
names in multiple jurisdictions for clients 
Impedes monitoring and tracing client activity 
and assets and allows quick, confidential 
movement of funds. May hide or facilitate illicit 
activity 
Offshore accounts 
“Shell” corporations or trusts formed to hold 
client assets offshore. Banker opens accounts 
in name of offshore entities 
Impedes monitoring and tracing client activity 
and assets. May hide or facilitate illicit activity 
Special name or numbered accounts 
Banker opens account in code name 
Impedes monitoring and tracing client activity 
and assets. May hide or facilitate illicit activity 
Wire transfers 
Banker facilitates complex wire transfers from 
multiple accounts to multiple destinations 
with substantial amounts 
Allows quick, complex movement of substantial 
funds across jurisdictional lines 
Concentration accounts 
Banker conducts client business through one 
single account that facilitates the processing 
and settlement of multiple individual customer 
transactions. The account that commingles the 
funds is used for internal purposes of the 
bank, but it can also be a method of hiding the 
origin of funds   
Impedes monitoring and tracing of client 
activity and assets. May hide or facilitate illicit 
activity 
Offshore recordkeeping 
Bank maintains client records offshore and 
minimizes or eliminates information in the 
country of residence 
Impedes bank, regulatory and law enforcement 
oversight 
Secrecy jurisdictions 
Bank conducts business in a jurisdiction which 
criminalizes disclosure of bank information 
and bars bank regulators from some other 
countries 
Impedes bank, regulatory and law enforcement 
oversight 
Source: US Permanent subcommittee on investigations (1999:45).
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Investigations of money laundering and of PEPs stealing public funds provide insights on the 
methods used to hide the true origin of the funds and the rightful owners. Banks are often involved 
in only parts of the money laundering chain and the placement of illicitly gained cash. Thus, 
improved regulation of the banking sector will only contribute to solve part of the problem (Tax 
Justice Network and Christian Aid, 2009; Block and Weaver, 2004; Mikuriya, 2009; Global 
Witness et al., 2009). 
 
A newer banking feature, mobile banking, should be added to the list above. The use of cell phones 
has opened new possibilities for millions of Africans who were previously without access to 
banking facilities. South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) are some of the countries where the service is operating. The cell phone banking 
facility does not require a pre-existing bank account, and the customer is allowed to open an 
account without a permanent address. According to Nefdt (2008), the mobile phone service is 
advantageous to users, but it also opens avenues of exploitation by criminals wishing to launder 
money without the scrutiny of a bank with regular Know Your Customer routines.  
 
The features listed above are commonly used by both legitimate customers and by those channelling 
illicit flows out of a country. Thus, the use of the service in itself is not necessarily a warning sign. 
The FATF and the Bank of International Settlements (BSI) have both released lists of what should 
be regarded to be suspicious activity.  
 
 
Suspicious customer activity in banks    
FATF   BIS  
 Unusual business activity 
 Unable to ascertain source of funds 
 Multiple deposits at different branches 
 Third party deposits in US dollar cash 
 Wire transfers following cash deposits 
 Wire transfers to specific 
location/accounts on a regular basis 
 Large cash deposits  
 
 Missing documents for identification of 
customer 
 Transactions with no obvious economic 
or commercial sense 
 Large cash deposits not consistent with 
normal and expected behaviour 
 Very high account turnover that is 
inconsistent with the size of the balance  
 Transactions through a customer account 
that is unusual  
Source: FATF (2008:31)  Source: BIS (2001:13) 
 
 
The table maps the most typical methods of channelling illicit funds through the formal banking 
system. The listed mechanisms are all documented in the literature. Typically banks in secrecy 
jurisdictions are used. The level of sophistication varies, and the most complex schemes include 
multiple jurisdictions and a large number of bank accounts in an array of banks. In many high-level 
cases the money is moved through a maze of shell companies and respectable nominees. Collusion 
with bank employees at all levels is often found (UNODC, 1998:71-73). As discussed above, the 
legitimacy of banking in secrecy jurisdiction is one of the most controversial topics in the literature. 
Also supporters of the secrecy structures do not deny that the features offered might facilitate illicit 
activity. Their argument, however, is that the secrecy jurisdictions are legitimate and that businesses 
using these services should not automatically be marked as suspicious or criminals (Christensen, 
2009; NHO, 2009).  
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Among other features offered by banks, trusts are heavily criticised since identification of the true 
beneficiary of the funds is often very difficult. The trust service in itself is not necessarily hiding 
criminal activity. For example, a trust can be established to provide for people who are not yet born. 
Still, the trust structure allows transfers of funds that cannot be checked for due diligence and Know 
Your Customer requirements (NOU, 2009).  
A case study from Nigeria 
Ajayi (2000: 227-229) explains the most common methods of illicit financial flows from Nigeria:  
 
 Carry cash out of the country and change the money into other currencies abroad  
 Smuggling of values across borders in the form of easily transportable valuables such as 
precious metals and collectibles, for example gold, silver, art and jewellery. Since this 
method involves smuggling, no banks in the home country need to be involved 
 Transfer pricing: Systematic overpricing and underinvoicing in trade transactions. The 
foreign buyer puts the difference in the price and payment into a foreign bank account in 
the exporter’s name 
 Underground banking where movement of capital is done in a system independent of the 
official banking system in the country  
 Transferring money overseas through commissions and agent fees paid by foreign 
contractors into foreign bank accounts of residents 
 Bank transfers from a local affiliate of a foreign institution to a designated recipient abroad 
 
The methods listed above provide important insights into the role of banks in facilitating illicit 
financial flows, though several of the methods may not involve banks directly. However, current 
knowledge of underground banking is limited. Although the mechanisms and systems are relatively 
well known in literature (McCusker, 2005; Passas, 2003; 2006) the interaction between formal 
banks and underground banks requires further exploration. One important issue for research is 
whether the activity of underground banks increases when stronger regulations are imposed on the 
formal banking sector.  
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5 Relevant organisations and institutions  
A wide range of international organisations are occupied with bank regulations and the challenges 
connected  to  illicit  financial  flows.  The  following  table  lists  the  most  important  ones.  A  short 
description of  key  activities of each organisation  is  included. More detailed  information  can be 
accessed via the organisations’ web links.  
 
Initiative  Description  Link  
Action Aid  Anti‐poverty agency that has been engaged 
in issues on tax evasion and international 
financial structures  
www.actionaid.org 
Bank for 
International 
Settlements (BIS) 
International organisation which fosters 
international monetary and financial 
cooperation and serves as a bank for central 
banks 
www.bis.org/ 
Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) 
Provides a forum for regular cooperation on 
banking supervisory matters 
www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm  
Basel Institute on 
Governance 
Independent non‐profit institution devoted 
to interdisciplinary research, policy advice 
and capacity building in the areas of public, 
corporate, and global governance (Center for 
Governance and Research), and offers special 
services in the field of asset recovery 
(International Center for Asset Recovery) 
www.baselgovernance.org/ 
Christian Aid   International NGO working to fight poverty. 
Illicit financial flows and tax evasion are 
addressed in several publications  
www.christianaid.org.uk/ 
Committee on 
Payment and 
Settlement Systems 
(CPSS) 
Aims to strengthening the financial market 
infrastructure through promotion of sound 
and efficient payment and settlement 
systems 
www.bis.org./cpss/index.htm 
Committee on the 
Global Financial 
System (CGFS) 
Monitors developments in global financial 
markets for central bank Governors 
www.bis.org/cgfs/index.htm  
Eastern and Southern 
Africa Money 
Laundering Group  
(ESAAMLG) 
Membership organisation for jurisdictions in 
Eastern and Southern Africa working 
together for prevention and control of the 
laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes 
www.esaamlg.org/  
Egmont Group For 
Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) 
Informal international association of FIUs   www.egmontgroup.org 
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Initiative  Description  Link  
Financial Action Task 
Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) 
Inter‐governmental body whose purpose is 
the development and promotion of national 
and international policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. FATF 40+9 
recommendations call for countries to 
operate FIUs that meet the Egmont Group’s 
definition 
www.fatf‐gafi.org   
Financial Stability 
Board  
Established to address vulnerabilities and to 
develop and implement strong regulatory, 
supervisory and other policies in the interest 
of financial stability 
www.financialstabilityboard.org
/index.htm  
Global Financial 
Integrity (GFI) and 
the Task Force on 
Financial Integrity 
and Economic 
Development 
Promotes national and multilateral policies, 
safeguards, and agreements aimed at 
curtailing the cross‐border flow of illegal 
money. The Task Force on Financial Integrity 
and Economic Development, initiated by GFI 
in 2009, is a coalition of civil society 
organisations and governments that work to 
address inequalities in the financial system 
www.gfip.org/  
Global Witness  NGO which investigates and campaigns to 
prevent natural resource‐related conflict and 
corruption 
www.globalwitness.org 
International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Publishes assessments of financial sectors in 
African countries and engages in Anti‐money 
laundering/Combating the financing of 
terrorism  
www.imf.org/external/np/leg/a
mlcft/eng/aml1.htm#customer  
IMF and the World 
Bank  
Financial sector assessment programme 
(FSAP). The programme brings together 
World Bank and IMF expertise to help 
countries reduce the likelihood and severity 
of financial sector crises 
www.worldbank.org/fsap  
Information Portal on 
Corruption in Africa 
Online resource portal on anti‐corruption and 
democratic governance in Africa 
www.ipocafrica.org 
Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS) 
Applied, policy oriented research institute 
operating across sub‐Saharan Africa. The 
Cape Town branch of ISS runs two major 
programmes on ‘Organised crime and money 
laundering’ and ‘Governance and anti‐
corruption’ 
www.issafrica.org 
International 
Organization of 
Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)
Membership organisation for jurisdictions to 
promote high standards, integrity and 
collaboration on market development 
www.iosco.org 
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Initiative  Description  Link  
Interpol  The world’s largest international police 
organisation, with 188 member countries. 
Facilitates cross‐border police co‐operation, 
and supports and assists all organisations, 
authorities and services whose mission is to 
prevent or combat international crime 
www.interpol.org   
Mauritius: Financial 
Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) 
Financial intelligence unit   www.fiumauritius.org/  
MONEYVAL; 
Council of Europe   
Select Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti‐Money Laundering 
 www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitorin
g/moneyval/  
Nigeria: Financial 
Intelligence Unit 
Financial intelligence unit  www.efccnigeria.org/index.php
?option=com_docman&task=ca
t_view&gid=18  
Organisation for 
Economic 
Coordination and 
Development (OECD) 
Involved in most aspects concerning the fight 
against illicit financial flows, anti‐corruption, 
tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist 
financing and asset recovery. The web page is 
a good resource for publications, statistics 
and information    
www.oecd.org 
South Africa: 
Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC)  
Financial intelligence unit  www.fic.gov.za/  
Stolen Asset 
Recovery Initiative 
(StAR)  
Partnership between the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 
World Bank. Aims to encourage and facilitate 
more systematic and timely return of assets 
stolen by politically exposed persons through 
acts of corruption     
http://go.worldbank.org/R9J4H
6T3G0 
The Norwegian 
Government’s Expert 
Commission of 
Inquiry into Capital 
Flight from 
Developing Countries
Expert commission on tax havens and 
development 
www.norad.no/Satsingsomr%C
3%A5der/Korrupsjonsbekjempe
lse/Offentlig+utvalg+mot+kapit
alflukt+og+skatteparadis/12153
6.cms 
Tax Research Limited  Private company researching and advising on 
tax issues and other aspects of governance. 
Directed by chartered accountant Richard 
Murphy 
www.taxresearch.org.uk/  
Tax Justice Network  Independent organisation which conducts 
research, analysis and advocacy in the field of 
taxation and regulation, including the 
developmental impacts of tax evasion and 
tax havens 
www.taxjustice.net 
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Initiative  Description  Link  
International Money 
Laundering 
Information Network 
(IMoLIN)  
Internet based network of organisations and 
individuals   
 www.imolin.org/  
U4  Anti‐corruption resource centre serving 
bilateral donors. Located at Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, Norway  
www.U4.no   
United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) 
Established in 1997 and operates in all 
regions of the world through an extensive 
network of field offices. Mandated to assist 
member states in their struggle against illicit 
drugs, crime and terrorism through technical 
cooperation and analytical work 
www.unodc.org 
US Senate 
Permanent 
Subcommittee on 
Investigations  
Investigation of cases linked to the U.S.   http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Subcom
mittees.Investigations  
Source: The table is compiled by the authors  
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6 Policy relevance of the reviewed literature  
Recommendations from the literature tend to reflect the complex web of actors involved in the 
moving, hiding and laundering of illicit financial flows. Policy advice can be categorised into 
recommendations for (i) private companies, (ii) national governments, (iii) international 
organisations, and (iv) commercial banks. For development agencies the literature provides advice 
that can be implemented in collaboration with international organisations, the donor’s own 
government and with the partner government or civil society organisations in the host country. The 
specific country setting should be considered when development partners decide who will be the 
best partner when addressing capital flight challenges. As argued by Goredema and Madzima 
(2009), the high levels of corruption that often is linked to capital flight from Africa are likely to put 
severe constraints on the implementation of reforms.   
Recommendations for banking institutions  
 Clear control mechanisms, policies and procedures to manage risk of money laundering 
may help bank staff and management to address and mitigate risk  
 Regular training of staff in due diligence and ‘know your customer’ (KYC) principles will 
give bank officers better knowledge on how to meet the official requirements in practice 
 Establishment of comprehensive KYC routines could help to detect suspicious transaction 
and to give guidance on how to act when discovered  
 Reporting routines to relevant authorities such as the Central Bank or the Financial 
Intelligence Unit could be established to make the process more streamlined for the bank 
personnel  
 Compliance officers at the management level may be given the responsibility to ensure that 
the regulatory framework is used in practice to signal that the area is a priority in the 
institution  
Recommendations for governments and development agencies  
 Illicit flows out of the developing world are a cross-ministerial issue for governments. 
Development agencies could therefore benefit from approaching a wide range of 
institutions in the country they are working in. As an example, counterparts in the treasury, 
justice, foreign and trade ministries can potentially all be key to coordinate an approach to 
money laundering, corruption and capital flight challenges 
 Asset recovery cases may require extensive juridical knowledge, capacity and resources. 
Donor agencies could therefore play a role in supporting governments in developing 
countries to build national capacity on asset recovery, provide professional assistance and 
other resources required to follow up asset recovery cases   
 UNCAC and FATF recommendations may be easier to follow in practice if governments 
agree on an effective review mechanism  
 FATF member governments could use their position within FATF to make fighting 
corruption a priority and to ensure that FATF members comply with the standards 
 Capacity building and training of bank personnel in due diligence and KYC principles and 
the rationale behind why these are important could be supported by donor agencies in 
collaboration with the bank sector 
 Identification of bank customers will be more secure with nationally approved and 
standardised identification papers. Donor agencies could potentially assist government 
effort to develop the system if requested  
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 Governments can establish legislation that makes aggressive, personal marketing of banking 
in tax havens within the boundaries of their country more difficult  
Recommendations for international organisations  
 FATF should assess whether their guidelines are sufficiently addressing the particular 
context of African economies which are (a) largely cash based, (b) there is a heavy reliance 
on a parallel, informal banking system, and (c) informal value transfer methods are the 
norm 
 NGOs and the media may play an important role in informing civil society of corrupt 
actions of PEPs by publishing knowledge that are made easily available for the public  
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7 Issues for further research  
The review clearly shows that there is a need for more in-depth and detailed knowledge on how 
banks are involved in and facilitate capital flight from Africa. The level of development and the 
structure of the banking sector vary substantially across Africa. Hence, there is a need to move 
beyond regional generalisations and averages, and to focus more on country specific issues. In 
particular, studies of the relationships between formal and underground banks in individual 
countries, and the relationships between these ‘onshore’ banks and financial institutions in secrecy 
jurisdictions, are likely to generate relevant insights for policy design based on solid understanding 
of the mechanisms applied by banks. Such studies may shed light on the linkages between financial 
institutions of various types (e.g. formal and informal banks, exchange bureaus, etc) and finance 
institutions at various levels (local, national, regional, international and offshore). Much of the 
current debate, however, focuses mainly on financial centres in secrecy jurisdictions. It is also 
important to gain better understanding of how banks with branches in different African countries 
operate in different settings, and what regulatory frameworks they apply. 
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